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Abstract: This paper presents long time series of stock and bond returns for Denmark
from 1922 to 1999. Average stock returns are low in an international context, but
returns (and volatility) have increased sharply since 1983 which may be explained by
major changes in economic policy and liberalizations of capital flows. On the other
hand, Danish bond yields are high in general, and in particular from the late 1960s to
the mid 1980s. Thus, there are several periods in which bonds have given higher
returns than stocks. Over the entire sample, however, equity clearly outperforms
bonds.
11. Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to report long time series of stock and bond returns
for Denmark and thereby make these series available for the research community.
Along with this, the paper also analyzes and presents a number of stylized facts that
apply to the two asset markets.
Long time series are useful for many purposes in economics and finance; the data set
offered in this paper has therefore many applications. Thus, by studying historical
movements of stock and bond returns, we get a yardstick for the future, assuming that
economies change only gradually and that we therefore can learn from history. Long
time series also make it possible to study specific time series patterns in the data. For
example, a number of researchers, like Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and
French (1988), have argued that high stock returns tend to be followed by low returns
and vice versa, and that stocks because of this tendency to mean revert are not as risky
in the long run as in the short run. This controversial view is also addressed in
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) who give an insightful review of the mean
reversion literature. Balvers, Wu and Gilliland (2000) extend the mean reversion
analysis to a cross-section analysis of 18 countries and argue that there is mean
reversion across countries. Consistent time series of stock returns and consumer price
inflation also enable us to analyze whether, and to what extent, stocks provide a hedge
against inflation? That is another issue which has implications for the riskiness of
stocks. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) were among the first to address this question,
using US data, and  Barnes, Boyd and Smith (1999) have recently reexamined the
inflation hedge issue in a cross country study consisting of 15 large and small,
developed and less developed countries. Furthermore, data on stock returns and
government bond yields allow researchers to estimate the risk premium on stocks,
defined as the difference between the return on stocks and the yield on short risk-free
government papers. This has led to an extensive literature on the Consumption-CAPM
and other asset pricing theories which attempt to explain the equity premium, see the
seminal paper by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and the survey by Kocherlakota (1996).
Finally, the stock market’s interaction with the real sector in the economy is also an
2issue that can be addressed using the data laid out in this paper. Thus, by combining
the stock market data with firms’ real investment expenditures we may obtain insight
into the validity of the Tobin’s q model of investment, and by examining the relations-
hip between consumer expenditures and the stock market, the magnitude of the wealth
effect in the consumption function may be analyzed. Insight into the stock market’s
effect on fixed real investment and real consumption provides the necessary tools for
assessing how a prolonged bear market, which several economists predict for the near
future (see e.g. Shiller, 2000), will be transmitted to the real economy.
Long financial time series are scarce in the Danish context. As regards the stock
market, Hansen (1974) reports stock returns based on a sample of firms for the period
1900-74, but Hansen only estimates the returns for consecutive 10-year periods
(decades) and for the (remaining) 1970-74 period. These data can therefore hardly be
used for time series analyses. Statistics Denmark has for many years reported a price
index (the socalled totalindeks) for a large sample of firms, but this index is exclusive
of dividends and can therefore not be used to calculate stock returns. In this paper, we
report an annual total stock return series, defined as the sum of the dividend yield and
the capital gain. The dividend yield is based on our own sample of stocks from
different sectors and of different sizes over the period 1922-99, whereas the capital
gain is based on the series published by Statistics Denmark. Because there are a large
number of both small and large caps in the sample, returns are likely to be representa-
tive for the whole market. Lund (1992) has constructed a large cap index in the sense
that he has picked 16 stocks with the explicit purpose of maximizing total capitaliza-
tion. Finally, Jennergren and Sørensen (1988) study daily and weekly returns of 25
Danish stocks in the 1890s. Other stock return series for Denmark have build on the
aforementioned studies or on pilot studies by various ministeries. In a nordic context,
Frennberg and Hansson (1992) have constructed monthly return indices for the
Swedish stock and bond markets.
To put the stock return series into perspective, we report comparable time series of 1-,
5- and 10-year yields to maturity on government bonds. Due to the thinness of the
3government bond market in the beginning of the sample period, it is not always
possible to find a bond with the desired time to maturity. Therefore, we have taken a
pragmatic approach by choosing the paper that comes closest in terms of expiration
date.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stock market data. In this
section, we also address the socalled survivorship bias often neglected in the literature. 
Section 3 describes the 1-, 5- and 10-year yields to maturity on government bonds and
discusses weaknesses of the bond yields. Section 4 presents stylized facts on Danish
stock returns. Section 5 presents the bond yields, and the excess return on stocks
relative to bonds. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Annual Stock returns
The stock market data are from two sources. Dividend yields are from our own sample
of the listed stocks on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, whereas capital gains are
calculated on the basis of the market index published by Statistics Denmark. The two
series should be regarded as estimates of true market values, ie., market dividend yield
and market capital gain, respectively. Thus, our portfolio of firms are sampled to
reflect the composition of firms on the market. In view of this objective, the fact that
Statistics Denmark’s and our portfolio are different is not a matter of concern as long
as they are representative. Our estimate of total annual stock return equals the sum of
the dividend yield and the capital gain; stock returns are calculated for the period 1922
to 1999.
2.1 Dividends
The dividend yield is estimated on the basis of a large sample of stocks listed below in
Table 1. These stocks represent the five sectors on the exchange, namely banking,
insurance, services, shipping and industry. We have both small and large caps in the
portfolio. The sample consists of 102 stocks in total,  accounting for 50 to 80 per cent
of the total market capitalization on the exchange (“Hovedbørsen” and later “Børs I”)
in the sample period.
4Table 1
Compared to a previous study by Hansen (1974) we estimate the yield for each year,
whereas Hansen only supplies estimates for 10-year periods. Lund (1992) has set up
another Danish database. His index contains 16 large caps deliberately chosen such as
to maximize total capitalization. 
The dividend yield is defined as dividends paid out during the calendar year divided
by the stock price quoted at the end of the previous year (late December). Thus, it is
assumed that dividends are not reinvested within the year they are paid out. In the rare
case of a secondary issue at a price below the market price and with dividend rights in
the year of the issuance, we have made a correction of the yield to make sure that the
dividend yield always measures the value of total dividends relative to the stock
market value at the end of the last year.
The dividend yield on the market portfolio of stocks is a weighted average of the
yields on the different stocks, where the weights each year equal the share of the total
market capitalization. Thus, our return index is a value-weighted index.
2.2 Capital gains
To construct the capital gain component of the return, we use the Danish Share Price
Index (Totalindekset). This index is published by Statistics Denmark, and captures the
price movement of a large sample of stocks. The size of the sample has gradually
expanded from around 50 companies in 1921 to all listed companies (except mutual
funds and a few other holding companies) from 1983 and onwards. The actual
portfolio of firms is not available. This index is also value-weighted. Weights are
adjusted at new issuances and withdrawals from the exchange.
2.3 Potential Biases
The dividend yield: This component may be underestimated due to the assumption
that dividends are not reinvested within the year. To get an idea of the magnitude of
5this bias, we consider a number of examples. To this end, it is first useful to note that
over the entire sample period 1922-99, the average (arithmetic) dividend yield is 4.6%
under the assumption that dividends are not reinvested within the year. The average
capital gain equals 7.1%. The average total return is thus 11.7%. The second impor-
tant feature is that dividends in most cases are paid out during the first 6 months of the
year.
Case 1. Suppose that dividends are paid out after 6 months and that shareprices
increase linearly such that the semiannual capital gain on average equals 3.6%. In case
dividends are reinvested when paid out, the yield associated with dividend payments
and reinvestment of these funds equals 4.8%, or 0.2% more than the estimate without
reinvestment of dividends.
Case 2. Suppose dividends are paid out after 3 months. Under the assumption of linear
capital gains, the growth rate in three quarters equals 5.3%. The bias is greater than in
the previous case but the difference disappears due to rounding. Thus, the bias is
0.2%.
The two cases demonstrate that the bias is 0.2% and fairly robust to the timing of
dividends. Prior to 1982, dividends made up a larger share of total return. However,
this does not imply that the bias due to non-reinvestment of dividends was larger,
because capital gains at the same time were smaller. Thus, from 1922 to 1982, the
average dividend yield is 5.4% and the capital gain is 4.2%. Hence, under the assump-
tion that dividends are paid after 6 (3) months, the bias in this period can be shown to
equal 0.1% (0.2%).
Rights issues at a discount: From 1983 and onwards, Statistics Denmark has made a
correction of the price index in case of right issues at prices below the market price.
The reason is of course that a rights issue with a discount to existing shareholders will
make the price of each share go down, and in case there is no correction the estimate
of the capital gain will be downward biased (in the year where the stock issue takes
6place). As Statistics Denmark has neglected this correction prior to 1983, the capital
gain component is underestimated. The bias is, however, likely to be small because of
a low frequency of secondary issues with price discounts.   
Survivor bias: Another source of error is an incorrect statistical treatment of
bankruptcies; an issue which is seldomly treated in the literature. Bankruptcies were
widespread in Denmark in the beginning of the 1920s. The most famous case is the
default of Landmandsbanken (the largest bank) in 1922. Statistics Denmark reports
two shareprice indices; one without and one with Landmandsbanken, where the latter
takes into account the losses associated with the bankruptcy of Landmandsbanken. We
use of course the latter index in the calculation of the capital gain component. On the
basis of our own data, we have also checked Statistics Denmarks calculation of the
fall in the share price from December 1921 to December 1922 (equals 29.1 %). By
calculating the value-weighted fall in share prices using the 26 shares we have for this
year and using all available information including the bankruptcy of
Landmandsbanken and (partial) bankruptcy of other firms, e.g. Superfos, we arrive at
exactly the same estimate as Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark does not, however, report how it has dealt with this problem
subsequently. Hence, it is possible that the shareprice index is upward biased (in case
there has not been proper adjustments for business failures). We have looked at the
late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and found that the bias on average was 0.4
% during this period. This is an upper limit of the survivor bias because the Danish
economy at that time experienced a deep recession.
Hence, it seems that the bias due to non-reinvestment of dividends within the year
more or less cancels out with the bankruptcy bias, which of course is a desirable
feature of the data. In the Danish case, there is therefore no reason to believe that
returns are grossly miscalculated due to these biases. 
For later reference equation (1) below defines the 1-year stock return. The nominal 1-
7S1(t) ’ D(t%1)Q(t) %
Q(t%1)&Q(t)
Q(t)
1%SR1(t) ’ (1%S1(t)) C(t)
C(t%1)
1%S5(t) ’ (1%S1(t)) @ ...@ (1%S(t%4))
1/5
year return in the period from time t to time t+1, denoted S1(t), equals the dividend
yield D(t+1)/Q(t) plus the capital gain (Q(t+1)-Q(t))/Q(t), where D(t+1) are dividends
from time t to t+1, and Q(t) is the stock price at date t. The corresponding 1-year real
return SR1(t) is defined by (2), where C(t) is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) at time t.
It is important to note that the real return defined by (2) is only approximately equal to
the more common but less exact definition of the real return given as the nominal
return S1 less the annual rate of CPI inflation. For future reference, it is also worth
noticing that e.g. the 5-year nominal return equals the geometric average of the
consecutive annual nominal returns. The formula for the 5-year nominal return is thus
given by (3). The formula for the 5-year real return is defined analogously (with CPI
at time t and t+5) and is therefore omitted.
(1)
(2)
(3)
3. Bond Yields
It is of interest to compare stock investments to other investment opportunities and in
particular to government bonds because that gives information about risk premia. In
the Danish case there has been very little work on the latter issue; there are, however,
data on private mortgage bond yields, see Olsen and Hoffmeyer (1968), but mortgage
bonds are first of all different from government bonds and, secondly, Olsen and
Hoffmeyer estimate their yields as average yields on bonds with very different time to
maturity. Christiansen and Lystbæk (1994) also construct a mortgage bond return
series but their series is based on bonds with 30-years to maturity. As we need
government bond yields for holding periods of fixed length, we have estimated bond
yields for the 1-, 5- and 10-year investment horizon. 
81-, 5- and 10-Year Yield to Maturity
These yields are defined as the yield to maturity at each investment horizon using the
standard definition of yield to maturity, see e.g. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997).
Because there were not that many government bonds outstanding in the past, it has not
always been possible to find a bond with the desired time to maturity; in such cases we
have taken a pragmatic approach, which means that we used the bond which is closest
in terms of maturity. For what we shall dub the 1-year interest rate series, the typical
maturity is between 9 and 12 months. The shortest maturity is 2 1/2 months (in 1941)
and the longest maturity is close to 3 years (in 1973). For the socalled 5-year bond, the
horizon typically varies between 4 and 6 years. The lowest maturity is 1 year and 7
months and the highest is 10 years and 8 months, both occurring in the thirties where
the outstanding stock of Government debt was exceptionally low. The typical maturity
of the 10-year bond is between 9 and 11 years, the shortest maturity is 6 years and 9
months (in 1925) and the longest is 14 years and 5 months (in 1933). From 1960 and
onwards, observations for the 10-year series are from OECD Statistical Compendium,
various issues.
The yield to maturity is in all cases calculated on the basis of the price of the bond on
the last trading day in December, the coupon and the timing of coupon payments. In
the calculation of the yield to maturity we have taken account of the fact that bonds
sellers are paid for accrued interest at the day where trade takes place  (Vedhængende
rente). Also, in case of a sinking fund (when the government is buying back securities
regularly), the future payments’ stream is affected, and in this case we use the expec-
ted payments stream in the estimation of the yield to maturity. 
The time to maturity on the three bonds is as mentioned only approximative due to
lack of data, which of course is a weakness. It should also be noted that despite the
popularity of the yield to maturity concept in economics and the financial press, it is
not without shortcomings as it assumes a flat yield curve (coupons can be reinvested at
the constant yield). The latter assumption has bearings for the volatility of the bond
yields. Thus, it is likely that this return concept leads to an underestimation of the
1
 This is the arithmetic return. The average geometric return equals 9.8%, see Table 2.
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volatility/riskiness of bond investments, whereas the effect on the average bond yield
is likely to be small as the yield curve sometimes is upward sloping and sometimes
downward sloping. Hence, we believe that the average excess return on stocks relative
to bonds (to be presented below) is not particular sensitive to this assumption. 
Let B1(t), B5(t), B10(t) denote the annualized 1-, 5- and 10-year nominal bond yields
from date t to t+1, from t to t+5, and from t to t+10, respectively. The 1-year real bond
yield BR1(t) is
(4)
and the 5- and 10-year real bond yields, BR5 and BR10, are defined analogously.
4. Basic Results and Insights for the Stock Market
Now follows a brief presentation of basic results, summary statistics and a short
account of the overall stock market development along with a presentation of outstan-
ding years. 
4.1 Summary Statistics and Changing Regimes
Table 2 below presents the average stock return and its components. Over the whole
sample period 1922-99, the average annual dividend yield equals 4.6%, the capital
gain amounts to 7.1% and, hence, the average stock return equals 11.7% with a
standard deviation of 22.9%.1 The movement of the annual stock return is illustrated
in Figure 1. The figure shows that the nominal return has fluctuated in a relatively
stable manner around a constant mean until the beginning of the 1980s with the high
yield in 1972 as a clear outlier. From the beginning of the 1980s and until the end of
the millennium, both the mean return and the variance of stock returns have increased
substantially. These observations are confirmed by the simple summary statistics listed
2
 The motivation for this particular sample split is twofold. First, major changes in economic
policy took place in 1983, see also below. Second, statistical analysis in Nielsen and Olesen (1999)
based on the Markov regime-switching model indicates that returns enter a new regime with higher
mean and volatility in the beginning of the 1980s.
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for the two subperiods 1922-82 and 1983-99.2 The average nominal return has thus
increased from 9.6% in 1922-82 to 19.3% in 1983-99. Along with a rise in the
average return, Table 2 also shows that the standard deviation has more than doubled.
The stock market has thus become much more volatile in the short term. It is, howe-
ver, interesting to note that the return-risk ratio, defined by the mean return divided by
the associated standard deviation, has stayed more or less constant over the two
subperiods.
Table 2
Figure 1    
 
The real stock return has displayed roughly the same behaviour as the nominal return.
Thus, the mean return has increased from 5.3% in 1922-82 to 15.3% in 1983-99 along
with more than a doubling of the standard deviation. The shift towards the recent
regime with high returns and high volatility is associated with a spectacular rise in
capital gains whereas dividends nowadays only account for a minor share of the stock
return, see Table 2 and Figure 2 which depicts the dividend yield. In contrast to our
results for nominal returns, the real return-risk ratio increases considerably (from 32%
to 45%) in the latter subsample.
Figure 2
4.2 A Brief account of the Movement of the Stock Market and Major Events
Figure 3 gives further insight into the role of price movements in the market. This
diagram presents the stock price index (exclusive of dividends) deflated by the
Consumer Price Index. The 1920s are characterized by an upward trend in the real
stock price index but also with considerable declines in 1922 and 1924, which in part
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reflects a tough monetary policy that aimed at restoring the real value of the Krone.
Thus, the CPI fell by 20% from 1920-24. The sharp deflation was accompanied by
several collapses of major banks and industrial companies, see Olsen and Hoffmeyer
(1968). The Wall Street crash in 1929 is associated with a minor fall in the Danish
index in 1930. The major adjustment occurs in 1931, where the real index went down
by 17%. The recovery sets in immediately after the crash, and the stock market reaches
a new peak in 1936. Thereafter, the stock market displays a remarkable trendwise
decline until the beginning of the 1980s. The only major interruption to this decline is
1972, which is the year when Denmark joined the EEC (now the EU). The declining
index contributed of course negatively to stock returns, but high dividend yields in this
period kept them on the positive scale. Following a long period with a declining real
stock index, the stock market went up by 100% in real terms in 1983. In 1987, stock
markets were worldwide characterized by steep declines, and the Danish index is no
exception as the real stock price falls by 9%, but that is immediately followed by a
43% increase in 1988. The first five years in the 1990s are characterized by temporary
ups and downs along a fairly constant mean. From 1995 and onwards the market has
been on a strong upward trend with 1998 as the only exception. Thus, from 1995 to
1999, the real index has gone up by 100%, which corresponds to an annual (arithme-
tic) mean increase of 25%. Thus, the Danish market has like many other markets been
very bullish in recent years.
Figure 3
Following this overview of the market history it is worthwile commenting on specta-
cular events. Let us pick the bad years first. The bad years are 1931 (17% real price
decline) and that has of course to do with the Great Depression which had worldwide
effects. Following Germany’s occupation of Denmark, the market went down by 20%
in 1940. But it is interesting to note that the sharpest declines have occured in modern
times, which underscores the point that the stock market nowadays is much more
volatile than in the past. Thus, the real index declined by 32% in 1974, which is likely
to be due to the first OPEC shock, relatively high inflation and large wage increases.
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In 1984, the market declined by 27% in real terms, which is more difficult to explain.
It may, however, reflect a correction of the huge upturn in the previous year. Thus, it
is possible that the market overeacted in 1983, where it went up by 100% in real
terms. In 1992, the real index declined by 27%, which in turn may be related to the
Gulf crisis. The sharp declines in 1974 and 1984 followed immediately after spectacu-
lar bull markets, indicating that the Danish stock market may display excess volatility.
This hypothesis was first proposed for US stock markets by Grossman and Shiller
(1981) and later discussed by Kleidon (1986).
There are two years in the history of the market that are outstanding, namely, 1972 and
1983. In 1972, the real index went up by 77%, and most of this increase came after
October 2 where a referendum resulted in Danish membership of the EEC. Along with
this, the stock exchange was opened up for foreign investors in 1973, which in turn
may have been anticipated and hence discounted by the market. The sharp increase in
the index in 1983 is the largest jump that has occurred since World War I. It is natural
to attribute the 1983 jump to three factors. First, there is a shift in economic policy in
late 1982 towards a non-accomodation strategy with tight fiscal policy and fixed
exchange rate policy as key elements, see Andersen and Risager (1988). This change
in economic policy was accompanied by a fall in the long interest rates by around 7
percentage points, cf. also the next session. Along with a fall in  interest rates it is also
possible that the risk premium declined reflecting the success of the macroeconomic
strategy and the associated stability gains. Altogether, there is no doubt that investors’
discount rate declined and that is an important factor in explaining the upturn in the
market. Second, a new tax on institutional investors’ real bond yields was passed by
Parliament in 1983 to be phased in from 1984 and onwards. Because stocks were not
subject to this tax, the current and anticipated after tax return to equity increased
sharply relative to bond investments and this will also lead to higher stock prices both
through increased demand and through the anticipation that institutional investors
would increase the proportion of stocks in their portfolios in the future, which indeed
has proved to be correct. Third, capital market liberalizations resulted in a lifting of all
restrictions on Danish investors’ foreign equity placements in 1984, see Eskesen et al.
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(1984), whereas the Danish stock market had been open to foreigners since 1973. The
liberalizations may have enlarged the window to the rest of the world, and because
many markets experienced very high returns in these years this may have had spillover
effects to the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We are, however, still short of formal
tests of the importance of the various explanations.
5. Bond Yields and the Equity Premium
The 1- and 10-year interest rates are recorded in Figure 4. From the beginning of the
sample to the late 1960s, bond yields fluctuate around a fairly constant mean. Then
follows a period with rising yields, reflecting higher inflation and a loose exchange
rate and fiscal policy. The turnaround of the Danish economy took place in late 1982
and this is also demonstrated by the large declines in interest rates. Thus from 1982 to
1983, the 1-, 5- and 10-year interest rate decline by 6.4, 6.8 and 6.3 percentage points,
respectively. These are the largest declines that have occured in the 20th century in
Denmark. Following the considerable downward jump, interest rates continue falling,
albeit much more smoothly, until they stabilize at the same level as before the inflatio-
nary regime which began in the late 1960s. 
Figure 4
   
Table 3 summarizes the average nominal and real bond yields as well as the associated
standard deviations. Whereas the average 5- and 10 year yields are almost identical
there is evidence of an upward sloping yield curve from the 1- to the 5-year horizon
insofar as the 1-year interest rate is on average about 0.5-0.8 percentage points below
the long interest rates. 
Table 3
Table 4 presents the 1-year equity premium, defined as the average stock return minus
the average government bond yield. On average over the period 1924-99, the equity
14
premium equals 4.1% per year. In an international perspective, the Danish equity
premium is at the low end of the scale. Thus, by comparing the Danish premium to the
11 other countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, USA, UK) in the millennium study of Dimson, Marsh and
Staunton (2000), it turns out that the Danish premium is the lowest premium recorded.
That reflects both a low stock return but also a relatively high bond yield, see Table 7
in Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2000).
Table 4
Figure 5
Despite the fact that stocks on average have given a higher return than bonds, it is
important to mention that there are several periods in which bonds have outperformed
stocks. That is shown in Figure 5, which illustrates the 5-year equity premium. Figure
5 shows that the premium displays a cyclical behaviour, that is, the premium varies
between positive and negative values. There are seven periods in the data where the
equity premium has been negative for more than one year. As shown, a negative
premium is in particular a characteristic of the 1980s due to the high interest rates we
have in this period. Notwithstanding this, stocks have over long periods performed
better than bonds. To illustrate this in further detail, consider the cumulative total
return indices in Figure 6 (note that the scale is logarithmic).
Figure 6
Figure 6 shows how an investment in the market portfolio of stocks in late 1924 has
grown over time, assuming that the annual payoff (dividend and capital gain) is
reinvested each year. Similarly, the diagram shows the outcome of repeated invest-
ments in 1-year bonds. For both investment strategies, we ignore transaction costs and
taxes. At the end of 1999, 1 Krone in stocks (bonds) would have grown to 1,200 (210)
Kroner. Another bond strategy is to invest in 10-year bonds. Consider therefore the
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case where the first investment is made in 1924, the next in 1934 and so forth. The
cumulative 10-year bond index is also shown in Figure 6. In spite long bonds perform
better than short bonds, stocks clearly outperform both bond strategies.
The corresponding real return indices are shown in Figure 7. The results show that the
purchasing power of investing 1 Krone in stocks, in 1-year and 10-year bonds would
have increased by a factor 59, a factor 10 and a factor 22, respectively, from 1924 to
1999. Over this very long period, stocks have thus outperformed long bonds by a
factor 3 in real terms. This result would not be weakened by taking investor taxation
into account; on the contrary. Thus, for most investors, fixed income securities have
been subject to a higher tax rate than equity, but that issue is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Figure 7
6. Conclusion
The main achievement of this paper is to report long time series of Danish stock
returns and bond yields. This extends previous work by Hansen (1974) who estimates
stock returns by decade only and Lund (1992) who calculates a large-cap index. Thus,
the present paper provides a well-diversified Danish stock return index for the long
historical period 1922-99. This paves the way for a wide range of economic and
statistical analyses of the Danish stock market. Besides this, the paper also makes
publicly available government bond yields with maturities of 1, 5 and 10 years. Other
studies have presented return series for private mortgage bonds, see Olsen and
Hoffmeyer (1968) and Christiansen and Lystbæk (1992).
These series allow us to outline important characteristics of the two asset markets. As
regards the stock market, the paper shows that the average real stock return is 7.5%
per year during the whole sample period, but closer examination shows that there are
two apparently distinct regimes. Thus, average return has tripled since 1983 even
though dividends have declined to one third of their previous level. Along with this,
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the stock market has become much more volatile as witnessed by the doubling of the
standard deviation. The high volatility may be due to liberalization of capital markets
which took place in the 1970s and the 1980s. This view is supported by Sellin (1996)
who finds that the increase in the Swedish stock market volatility is largely due to the
opening up of the market to foreign investors. The higher return on stocks since the
beginning of the 1980s, which parallels findings for other countries, remains an
important topic for future research.
The paper also calculates the yield on bonds and finds that the short real bond yield is
about 4% lower than the stock return. Thus, the equity premium is 4.1% per year and
that is low in an international context, see also Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2000).
The explanation is both a low stock return and a high interest rate. Thus, bonds have
frequently outperformed stocks from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s. Notwithstanding
this, stocks have over long periods performed better than bonds. Thus, 1 Krone
invested in stocks in 1924 is worth 1,200 Kroner today which is six times the value
generated by repeated investment in short bonds.
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Appendix
Dividend yields and stock returns refer to the calendar year with which they are given
whereas bond yields are measured at the end of the year. For example, the nominal
stock return in 1922 (-20.98%) is the return from December 1921 to December 1922
and the 5-year nominal bond yield in 1922 (5.31%) is the yield of a bond with 5 years
to maturity as measured in December 1922.
Year Dividend
yield
Nominal
Stock
Return
Real
Stock
Return
1-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
5-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
10-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
1922 0.0808 -0.2098 -0.0699 n.a. 0.0531 0.0499
1923 0.0804 0.5564 0.4941 n.a. 0.0638 0.0562
1924 0.0668 -0.0242 -0.0794 0.0692 0.0736 0.0643
1925 0.0715 0.1817 0.2161 0.0506 0.0595 0.0586
1926 0.0530 -0.0198 0.1538 0.0728 0.0598 0.0595
1927 0.0595 0.1588 0.1999 0.0564 0.0563 0.0570
1928 0.0610 0.0283 0.0344 0.0506 0.0518 0.0537
1929 0.0586 0.0904 0.0969 0.0520 0.0521 0.0534
1930 0.0607 -0.0168 0.0326 0.0445 0.0450 0.0507
1931 0.0582 -0.1584 -0.1079 0.0635 0.0678 0.0620
1932 0.0562 0.0342 0.0412 0.0368 0.0427 0.0500
1933 0.0528 0.3482 0.3129 0.0275 0.0418 0.0450
1934 0.0515 0.1503 0.1069 0.0333 0.0406 0.0456
1935 0.0506 0.0792 0.0400 0.0404 0.0504 0.0505
1936 0.0523 0.1683 0.1543 0.0454 0.0543 0.0526
1937 0.0532 -0.0359 -0.0694 0.0461 0.0516 0.0512
1938 0.0602 0.0451 0.0331 0.0373 0.0435 0.0513
1939 0.0596 -0.0002 -0.0280 0.0499 0.0597 0.0597
1940 0.0585 0.0585 -0.1494 0.0107 0.0469 0.0469
20
Year Dividend
yield
Nominal
Stock
Return
Real
Stock
Return
1-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
5-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
10-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
1941 0.0445 0.2445 0.0847 0.0248 0.0466 0.0459
1942 0.0391 0.0562 0.0205 0.0190 0.0319 0.0358
1943 0.0348 0.1777 0.1689 0.0108 0.0208 0.0312
1944 0.0334 0.0040 -0.0180 0.0108 0.0307 0.0330
1945 0.0307 -0.0375 -0.0480 0.0189 0.0274 0.0280
1946 0.0416 0.0904 0.0983 0.0142 0.0258 0.0315
1947 0.0450 0.0062 -0.0222 0.0189 0.0445 0.0205
1948 0.0457 -0.0511 -0.0740 0.0428 0.0374 0.0238
1949 0.0520 0.1055 0.0795 0.0322 0.0333 0.0442
1950 0.0515 0.0939 0.0027 0.0459 0.0450 0.0474
1951 0.0507 -0.0225 -0.1251 0.0363 0.0560 0.0657
1952 0.0606 0.0693 0.0462 0.0468 0.0516 0.0586
1953 0.0623 0.0971 0.1030 0.0688 0.0510 0.0564
1954 0.0629 0.1301 0.1090 0.0589 0.0718 0.0699
1955 0.0705 0.2280 0.1512 0.0549 0.0668 0.0711
1956 0.0561 0.1616 0.1063 0.0591 0.0745 0.0682
1957 0.0526 -0.0754 -0.0862 0.0499 0.0675 0.0694
1958 0.0551 0.2477 0.2261 0.0475 0.0461 0.0504
1959 0.0501 0.0898 0.0674 0.0465 0.0609 0.0369
1960 0.0434 0.0515 0.0280 0.0570 0.0662 0.0630
1961 0.0448 0.0288 -0.0151 0.0584 0.0720 0.0690
1962 0.0498 0.0742 0.0075 0.0704 0.0687 0.0686
1963 0.0490 0.1522 0.0951 0.0670 0.0627 0.0674
1964 0.0449 0.1024 0.0639 0.0845 0.0746 0.0738
21
Year Dividend
yield
Nominal
Stock
Return
Real
Stock
Return
1-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
5-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
10-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
1965 0.0437 0.1127 0.0454 0.0858 0.0875 0.0900
1966 0.0493 0.0171 -0.0471 0.1020 0.1078 0.0912
1967 0.0491 -0.0509 -0.1166 0.1153 0.1137 0.0946
1968 0.0517 0.1628 0.0769 0.0939 0.1075 0.0906
1969 0.0496 0.0580 0.0223 0.1197 0.1000 0.1009
1970 0.0526 -0.0466 -0.1057 0.1378 0.1270 0.1158
1971 0.0612 0.0337 -0.0231 0.0951 0.1009 0.1143
1972 0.0642 0.9510 0.8307 0.1202 0.0935 0.1149
1973 0.0376 0.0376 -0.0507 0.1123 0.1079 0.1311
1974 0.0430 -0.1697 -0.2792 0.1629 0.1292 0.1654
1975 0.0556 0.3934 0.2712 0.0905 0.1093 0.1327
1976 0.0437 0.0437 -0.0426 0.1706 0.1697 0.1558
1977 0.0486 0.0385 -0.0659 0.1706 0.1733 0.1700
1978 0.0521 -0.0091 -0.1991 0.1673 0.1565 0.1823
1979 0.0622 -0.0030 -0.0906 0.1739 0.1785 0.1817
1980 0.0687 0.1908 0.0600 0.1648 0.1889 0.1998
1981 0.0635 0.4583 0.3059 0.1711 0.1926 0.2013
1982 0.0581 0.1817 0.0728 0.1839 0.1935 0.2136
1983 0.0385 1.1785 1.0375 0.1197 0.1254 0.1507
1984 0.0171 -0.2025 -0.2497 0.1246 0.1368 0.1450
1985 0.0286 0.4598 0.3937 0.0872 0.0939 0.1164
1986 0.0202 -0.1722 -0.2011 0.0997 0.1117 0.1010
1987 0.0290 -0.0280 -0.0655 0.1026 0.1009 0.1134
1988 0.0293 0.5238 0.4571 0.0821 0.0898 0.0960
22
Year Dividend
yield
Nominal
Stock
Return
Real
Stock
Return
1-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
5-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
10-Year
Nominal
Bond
Yield
1989 0.0137 0.3482 0.2869 0.1126 0.1056 0.0977
1990 0.0109 -0.1213 -0.1436 0.1075 0.1071 0.1058
1991 0.0125 0.1331 0.1063 0.1006 0.0908 0.0925
1992 0.0149 -0.2429 -0.2585 0.1089 0.0964 0.0891
1993 0.0130 0.4099 0.3929 0.0622 0.0571 0.0717
1994 0.0102 -0.0362 -0.0554 0.0711 0.0877 0.0794
1995 0.0139 0.0626 0.0408 0.0464 0.0626 0.0825
1996 0.0150 0.3047 0.2778 0.0341 0.0534 0.0710
1997 0.0132 0.4841 0.4522 0.0429 0.0503 0.0565
1998 0.0106 -0.0460 -0.0638 0.0393 0.0391 0.0424
1999 0.0109 0.2256 0.1963 0.0424 0.0513 0.0550
Year 1-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
5-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
10-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
1922 n.a. 0.0803 0.0769
1923 n.a. 0.1015 0.0849
1924 0.1004 0.1261 0.0953
1925 0.2366 0.1158 0.0823
1926 0.1108 0.0930 0.0645
1927 0.0627 0.0832 0.0545
1928 0.0569 0.0717 0.0495
1929 0.1050 0.0624 0.0456
23
Year 1-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
5-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
10-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
1930 0.1071 0.0373 0.0153
1931 0.0706 0.0451 0.0064
1932 0.0097 0.0120 -0.0092
1933 -0.0112 0.0142 -0.0120
1934 -0.0043 0.0151 -0.0098
1935 0.0279 -0.0119 -0.0025
1936 0.0092 -0.0328 0.0014
1937 0.0342 -0.0351 0.0007
1938 0.0085 -0.0418 -0.0005
1939 -0.1563 -0.0257 0.0079
1940 -0.1190 0.0034 0.0090
1941 -0.0099 0.0325 0.0107
1942 0.0114 0.0191 0.0022
1943 -0.0114 0.0048 -0.0010
1944 -0.0002 0.0143 0.0011
1945 0.0263 -0.0043 -0.0091
1946 -0.0144 -0.0290 -0.0113
1947 -0.0057 -0.0100 -0.0202
1948 0.0182 -0.0109 -0.0155
1949 -0.0538 -0.0138 0.0044
1950 -0.0639 0.0019 0.0140
1951 0.0138 0.0251 0.0387
1952 0.0525 0.0228 0.0274
1953 0.0489 0.0193 0.0195
24
Year 1-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
5-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
10-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
1954 -0.0072 0.0390 0.0308
1955 0.0047 0.0429 0.0322
1956 0.0466 0.0515 0.0277
1957 0.0401 0.0338 0.0228
1958 0.0260 0.0047 -0.0022
1959 0.0231 0.0159 -0.0163
1960 0.0118 0.0129 0.0043
1961 -0.0073 0.0140 0.0086
1962 0.0174 0.0094 0.0083
1963 0.0297 -0.0015 0.0033
1964 0.0189 0.0099 -0.0012
1965 0.0173 0.0217 0.0108
1966 0.0256 0.0426 0.0098
1967 0.0329 0.0498 0.0095
1968 0.0570 0.0415 0.0039
1969 0.0504 0.0125 0.0076
1970 0.0753 0.0316 0.0159
1971 0.0276 0.0017 0.0091
1972 0.0248 -0.0134 0.0063
1973 -0.0343 -0.0016 0.0232
1974 0.0609 0.0276 0.0627
1975 0.0003 0.0046 0.0376
1976 0.0529 0.0542 0.0641
1977 0.0643 0.0594 0.0844
25
Year 1-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
5-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
10-Year
Real
Bond
Yield
1978 0.0648 0.0502 0.1013
1979 0.0449 0.0768 0.1058
1980 0.0430 0.1016 0.1330
1981 0.0632 0.1217 0.1442
1982 0.1073 0.1355 0.1647
1983 0.0535 0.0755 0.1105
1984 0.0737 0.0895 0.1095
1985 0.0492 0.0527 0.0845
1986 0.0573 0.0723 0.0712
1987 0.0544 0.0658 0.0851
1988 0.0329 0.0620 0.0709
1989 0.0843 0.0831 0.0750
1990 0.0813 0.0857 n.a.
1991 0.0780 0.0704 n.a.
1992 0.0954 0.0757 n.a.
1993 0.0410 0.0358 n.a.
1994 0.0492 0.0648 n.a.
1995 0.0249 n.a. n.a.
1996 0.0118 n.a. n.a.
1997 0.0235 n.a. n.a.
1998 0.0144 n.a. n.a.
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table 1. Companies in the database. They provide the basis for the dividend
index:
Banking:
Aktivbank
Amagerbanken
Amtssparekassen Fyn
Andelsbanken
C & G Banken
Den Danske Bank
Fyens Disconto Kasse
Handelsbanken
Privatbanken
Provinsbanken
UniDanmark
Aarhus Privatbank
Insurance:
Alm Brand B
Alm Brandass A
Alm Brandass B
Baltica
Codan
Kbh. Reassurance A
Kbh. Reassurance B
Kbh. Reassurance C
Shipping:
DFDS
D/S 1912 A
D/S 1912 B
D/S Bornholm
D/S Dannebrog
D/S Myren
D/S Norden
D/S Orient
D/S Torm
J Lauritzen
D/S Svendborg A
D/S Svendborg B
Service:
Andersen & Martini
Sophus Berendsen A
Sophus Berendsen B
F L Bie
Brdr Dahl
D G Holding B
Dalhoff Larsen & Horneman
Det danske Kulkompagni
Danske Luftfartsselskab
Ford Motor Co
Peder P Hedegaard
ISS A
ISS B
Brdr A & O Johansen
Jydsk Telefon
Korn- og Foderstofkomp.
Københavns Telefon
Nesa
C O Olesen Holding B
Tivoli A
Tivoli B
Wessel og Vett C
Th Wessel og Vett præf.
Østasiatisk Kompagni
ØK Holding
Industry:
Albani A
Albani B
Ove Arkil
Atlas
Bang & Olufsen
Bing & Grøndahl
Burmeister & Wain Stamak.
Calkas A
Calkas B
Cheminova Holding B
Chemitalic B
Christiani & Nielsen B
Coloplast B
CUBIC Modulsystem B
Dancall Radio A
Dancall Radio B
Danisco
Dansk Data Elektronik
Danske Spritfabrikker
Danske Sukkerfabrikker A
Danske Vin- og Konservesf.
Forenede Bryggerier A
Forenede Bryggerier B
Forenede Bryggerier C
Forenede Papirfabrikker
Brdr Hartmann
Incentive
Kastrup Glasværk
Københavns Brødfabrikker
Nordisk Fjerfabrik A
Nordisk Fjerfabrik B
Nordisk Kabel- og Trådf.
Novo Industri
C W Obel B
Royal Copenhagen A
Royal Copenhagen B
Schouw & Co A
Schouw & Co B
F L Smidt A
F L Smidt B
Superfos
Superfos præference
Thrige-Titan A
Thrige-Titan B
Aarhus Oliefabrik A
Aarhus Oliefabrik B
Table 2. Average annual stock return and its components in %
Dividend
yield
Capital
gain
Nominal
stock
return
Standard
deviation
Real
stock
return
Standard
deviation
1922-99 4.6 7.1
(5.1)
11.7
(9.8)
22.9 7.5
(5.7)
21.5
1922-82 5.4 4.2
(3.0)
9.6
 (8.4)
17.5 5.3
(4.3)
16.4
1983-99 1.8 17.5
(13.0)
19.3
(14.7)
36.0 15.3
(11.1)
33.7
Note: Averages are arithmetic (geometric means in parentheses).
Table 3. Average nominal and real 1-, 5- and 10-year bond yields in %, 1924-99
Nominal
yield
Standard
deviation
Real
yield
Standard
deviation
1-year 7.4 4.5 3.3 5.2
5-year 7.9 4.2 3.5 4.1
10-year 8.2 4.5 3.3 4.4
Note: The sample for real bond yield is only until 1994 (1989) at the 5-year (10-year) horizon because we 
use forward-looking inflation data.
Table 4. Nominal equity premium in %
Equity premium Standard deviation
1924-99 4.1 22.6
1924-82 2.1 16.6
1983-99 11.2 36.4
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